Evil
Personale a Terra
Le prossime note sono tratte dal libricino: MIG-21 Units of the Vietnam War
-MiG-21 pilots initially got accustomed to ‘combat’ by intercepting American Ryan Firebee unmanned reconnaissance drones, the first of these being downed on 4 March 1966. (about 18000 m)
-The VPAF also found that ‘Fishbeds’ operating in pairs were more successful when they went into combat armed with a mix of weapons. A typical mission fit would see the lead pilot’s aircraft armed with two infra-red guided R-3S AAMs, while his wingman’s MiG-21 would boast two UB-16-57 pods loaded with S-5M unguided rockets.
And it was with this weapons load that a pair of MiG-21PF ‘Fishbed-Ds’ attacked two F-105s at an altitude of just 500 m on 7 June 1966. The trailing MiG opened fire from 1500 m, but the Thunderchief initially evaded the fusilade of unguided rockets by making an evasive left turn. Undeterred, the communist pilot pressed home his attack, firing two more salvoes of missiles from 500 and 200 m, which reportedly destroyed the F-105
-Senior officers in Hanoi also stipulated that aircraft flying in pairs would remain between 50 and 200 m apart. In flights of four, each pair would maintain a distance of between 300 and 700 m from the other. However, this was later modified to 500-800 m and 800 m respectively, as it was found that a widely spread formation presented intercepting US fighters with a more difficult target.Such open formations only became possible after the ‘Fishbeds’ began operating above altitudes of 2500 m.
-In an effort to make the MiG-21 more manoeuvrable, a choice was also made in favour of the R-3S missile instead of the unguided S-5M carried in bulky UB-16-57 pods.
-These new tactics called for MiG-17s and -21s to jointly conduct combat air patrols (CAPs) in airspace most often used by incoming US fighter-bombers. The MiG-17s would patrol at a low altitude (up to 1500 m), while the MiG-21s from the 921st’s base at Noi Bai would fly above them (at altitudes in excess of 2500 m). Anywhere between 1500 and 2500 m was considered to be an intermediate zone where both types could take part in dogfights.
-Due to the ‘Fishbed’s’ heavily framed canopy, detecting an AIM-9 Sidewinder being launched was much more difficult for MiG-21 pilots than for those flying MiG-17s. It was the job of the MiG-21 wingman to watch his back, and that of his flight leader, and if he spotted a missile closing on either of them he would yell out a warning so they could perform a high-g turn into and below the round. This manoeuvre would usually break the lock of the AIM-9’s infrared seeker head on the MiG-21’s tailpipe. If the pilots performed this turn quickly enough, they would be able to dodge the missile.
-when dealing with the MiG-21, F-4 crews were told to lure the ‘Fishbed’ pilot into a horizontal dogfight, and to avoid vertical manoeuvring.Flying with an increased combat spread of 900 m, a pair of Phantom IIs could keep a far better look-out for each other, and sound a warning in the event of an imminent MiG-21 attack. By this stage the Americans had also discovered that the ‘Fishbed’ could out turn the F-4 at medium and high altitudes, but that the Phantom II had the advantage ‘down low’. F-4 crews were duly instructed to dive to a lower altitude as soon as they encountered a MiG-21.
- (1972) In an effort to counter the new US tactics, the VPAF introduced attack flights patrolling at altitudes of between 300 and 800 m, operating in conjunction with deception flights at ceilings of 8000 to 10,000 m. The two-aircraft sections would patrol some ten to fifteen kilometres apart. While aircraft in the ‘dummy’ flight would fly at just 900 km/h, the attack group would patrol at 1200 km/h. Both flights stayed in airspace under radar control, receiving their orders from the command centre.
-"...Targeting the lead aircraft, Thu’s high speed and angle of attack was too great for his AAM, and the missile failed to make contact."
piccola citazione della controparte:
"One of the challenges the flight lead has, particularly with a flight of four, is manoeuvring the formation. In combat, you do not want to keep your aeroplane flying in a straight line for any longer than half your altitude above the ground in seconds. Today, that equated to ten seconds. Because the threat was from the air, our flight lead modified this to 15 seconds, which meant we were moving the aircraft frequently, and not just cruising around. Not only did this provide a less predictable target to any North Vietnamese threat, but it allowed us to roll up on a wing and check below the flight. This constant manoeuvring, added “g” to make the manoeuvre and the addition of power to the engines meant we used up fuel fast. An additional problem for “blue four” was that always being on the extremes of the turns meant more throttle jockeying to maintain position. This caused us to have the lowest fuel state in the flight".
-A significant player in Operation Linebacker was the B-52, examples of which were attacking targets across the north at night. Neither the MiG-17 or -19 could touch the high-flying Boeing bomber, so it was left to the MiG-21 to deal with this deadly threat.
-"Soon I noticed another formation of aircraft, and switched on my RP-21 radar unit, but because of the jamming, I could not identify the targets. My presence did not go unnoticed by the Americans, and the B-52s increased their speed."
-"The Americans were holding formation, keeping a separation of approximately two to three kilometres. I made last-minute checks on my missiles, and when I reached the level of the third B-52, I pushed the fire button on the control stick, launching two heat-seeking missiles from a distance of two kilometres. Huge flames were visible around the second B-52 as I broke sharply to the left and descended to 2000 m, before landing at Yen Bai. The attacked formation of B-52s immediately dropped their load and returned to base. The crew of the hit B-52 was killed"
Logistica:
-No fewer than 50 missions were flown from the taxyway, with aircraft using SPRD-99 rocket-assist take-off (RATO) bottles to get airborne. Unable to land on Noi Bai’s bomb-damaged main runway, pilots either ejected after the mission, or recovered at another airfield.
-In the course of American air raids against Noi Bai, Kep, Kien An and Hoa Lac between January 1967 and March 1968, seventeen aircraft, three helicopters and numerous fuel trucks, buildings and runways were destroyed. In 50 per cent of the raids, the target airfield would be put out of action from as little as five hours to several days. Of all the bombs dropped, about 40 per cent found their mark, with 30 per cent hitting runways and ten per cent taxyways. In all, these four bases were put out of action on 36 separate occasions, for a total of 120 days over a period of 15 months.
-The aircraft shelters were usually positioned between 500 and 2000 m from the runway, although sometimes they were sited as far away as 3000 m. The concrete taxyways from the shelters were 20 m wide, and could also serve as runways. Jet fuel storage tanks were placed underground about 200 m apart.
-New shelters were duly constructed in their place. They looked like normal huts, although their roofs were made from rails and the steel plates used for runway construction, with 20-25 cm of soil then piled on top and covered with turf. The structure was based on the dimensions of the MiG-21, being 15 m long, 10 m wide and 7 m high, and using up 30-35 rails and 300 plates (each 4 m long). Smaller MiG-17s were never housed in the revised shelters.
Trasporto aerei con elicottero! In pratica li conservavano da altre parti e li portavano in pista per la preparazione e decollo.
-VPAF fighters would also be transported beneath Mi-6 helicopters to mountain caves up to 30 kilometres away, where they were then pushed into their hiding places by truck. A special harness was designed to protect the aircraft, with two softly-lined straps being thrown around the fuselage and attached to a trapeze. Three cables of 12 mm thickness were then connected from the hook of the Mi-6 to the trapeze, while two others were attached to the wingtips. The Mi-6 was able to lift a fully-fuelled and armed MiG-17, but in the case of MiG-19s and MiG-21s, only empty aircraft could be carried.
Potrei anche pescare qualche nota da un libro sull'f4G nella desert storm e desert shield. Ma devo ancora collezionarle...
-MiG-21 pilots initially got accustomed to ‘combat’ by intercepting American Ryan Firebee unmanned reconnaissance drones, the first of these being downed on 4 March 1966. (about 18000 m)
-The VPAF also found that ‘Fishbeds’ operating in pairs were more successful when they went into combat armed with a mix of weapons. A typical mission fit would see the lead pilot’s aircraft armed with two infra-red guided R-3S AAMs, while his wingman’s MiG-21 would boast two UB-16-57 pods loaded with S-5M unguided rockets.
And it was with this weapons load that a pair of MiG-21PF ‘Fishbed-Ds’ attacked two F-105s at an altitude of just 500 m on 7 June 1966. The trailing MiG opened fire from 1500 m, but the Thunderchief initially evaded the fusilade of unguided rockets by making an evasive left turn. Undeterred, the communist pilot pressed home his attack, firing two more salvoes of missiles from 500 and 200 m, which reportedly destroyed the F-105
-Senior officers in Hanoi also stipulated that aircraft flying in pairs would remain between 50 and 200 m apart. In flights of four, each pair would maintain a distance of between 300 and 700 m from the other. However, this was later modified to 500-800 m and 800 m respectively, as it was found that a widely spread formation presented intercepting US fighters with a more difficult target.Such open formations only became possible after the ‘Fishbeds’ began operating above altitudes of 2500 m.
-In an effort to make the MiG-21 more manoeuvrable, a choice was also made in favour of the R-3S missile instead of the unguided S-5M carried in bulky UB-16-57 pods.
-These new tactics called for MiG-17s and -21s to jointly conduct combat air patrols (CAPs) in airspace most often used by incoming US fighter-bombers. The MiG-17s would patrol at a low altitude (up to 1500 m), while the MiG-21s from the 921st’s base at Noi Bai would fly above them (at altitudes in excess of 2500 m). Anywhere between 1500 and 2500 m was considered to be an intermediate zone where both types could take part in dogfights.
-Due to the ‘Fishbed’s’ heavily framed canopy, detecting an AIM-9 Sidewinder being launched was much more difficult for MiG-21 pilots than for those flying MiG-17s. It was the job of the MiG-21 wingman to watch his back, and that of his flight leader, and if he spotted a missile closing on either of them he would yell out a warning so they could perform a high-g turn into and below the round. This manoeuvre would usually break the lock of the AIM-9’s infrared seeker head on the MiG-21’s tailpipe. If the pilots performed this turn quickly enough, they would be able to dodge the missile.
-when dealing with the MiG-21, F-4 crews were told to lure the ‘Fishbed’ pilot into a horizontal dogfight, and to avoid vertical manoeuvring.Flying with an increased combat spread of 900 m, a pair of Phantom IIs could keep a far better look-out for each other, and sound a warning in the event of an imminent MiG-21 attack. By this stage the Americans had also discovered that the ‘Fishbed’ could out turn the F-4 at medium and high altitudes, but that the Phantom II had the advantage ‘down low’. F-4 crews were duly instructed to dive to a lower altitude as soon as they encountered a MiG-21.
- (1972) In an effort to counter the new US tactics, the VPAF introduced attack flights patrolling at altitudes of between 300 and 800 m, operating in conjunction with deception flights at ceilings of 8000 to 10,000 m. The two-aircraft sections would patrol some ten to fifteen kilometres apart. While aircraft in the ‘dummy’ flight would fly at just 900 km/h, the attack group would patrol at 1200 km/h. Both flights stayed in airspace under radar control, receiving their orders from the command centre.
-"...Targeting the lead aircraft, Thu’s high speed and angle of attack was too great for his AAM, and the missile failed to make contact."
piccola citazione della controparte:
"One of the challenges the flight lead has, particularly with a flight of four, is manoeuvring the formation. In combat, you do not want to keep your aeroplane flying in a straight line for any longer than half your altitude above the ground in seconds. Today, that equated to ten seconds. Because the threat was from the air, our flight lead modified this to 15 seconds, which meant we were moving the aircraft frequently, and not just cruising around. Not only did this provide a less predictable target to any North Vietnamese threat, but it allowed us to roll up on a wing and check below the flight. This constant manoeuvring, added “g” to make the manoeuvre and the addition of power to the engines meant we used up fuel fast. An additional problem for “blue four” was that always being on the extremes of the turns meant more throttle jockeying to maintain position. This caused us to have the lowest fuel state in the flight".
-A significant player in Operation Linebacker was the B-52, examples of which were attacking targets across the north at night. Neither the MiG-17 or -19 could touch the high-flying Boeing bomber, so it was left to the MiG-21 to deal with this deadly threat.
-"Soon I noticed another formation of aircraft, and switched on my RP-21 radar unit, but because of the jamming, I could not identify the targets. My presence did not go unnoticed by the Americans, and the B-52s increased their speed."
-"The Americans were holding formation, keeping a separation of approximately two to three kilometres. I made last-minute checks on my missiles, and when I reached the level of the third B-52, I pushed the fire button on the control stick, launching two heat-seeking missiles from a distance of two kilometres. Huge flames were visible around the second B-52 as I broke sharply to the left and descended to 2000 m, before landing at Yen Bai. The attacked formation of B-52s immediately dropped their load and returned to base. The crew of the hit B-52 was killed"
Logistica:
-No fewer than 50 missions were flown from the taxyway, with aircraft using SPRD-99 rocket-assist take-off (RATO) bottles to get airborne. Unable to land on Noi Bai’s bomb-damaged main runway, pilots either ejected after the mission, or recovered at another airfield.
-In the course of American air raids against Noi Bai, Kep, Kien An and Hoa Lac between January 1967 and March 1968, seventeen aircraft, three helicopters and numerous fuel trucks, buildings and runways were destroyed. In 50 per cent of the raids, the target airfield would be put out of action from as little as five hours to several days. Of all the bombs dropped, about 40 per cent found their mark, with 30 per cent hitting runways and ten per cent taxyways. In all, these four bases were put out of action on 36 separate occasions, for a total of 120 days over a period of 15 months.
-The aircraft shelters were usually positioned between 500 and 2000 m from the runway, although sometimes they were sited as far away as 3000 m. The concrete taxyways from the shelters were 20 m wide, and could also serve as runways. Jet fuel storage tanks were placed underground about 200 m apart.
-New shelters were duly constructed in their place. They looked like normal huts, although their roofs were made from rails and the steel plates used for runway construction, with 20-25 cm of soil then piled on top and covered with turf. The structure was based on the dimensions of the MiG-21, being 15 m long, 10 m wide and 7 m high, and using up 30-35 rails and 300 plates (each 4 m long). Smaller MiG-17s were never housed in the revised shelters.
Trasporto aerei con elicottero! In pratica li conservavano da altre parti e li portavano in pista per la preparazione e decollo.
-VPAF fighters would also be transported beneath Mi-6 helicopters to mountain caves up to 30 kilometres away, where they were then pushed into their hiding places by truck. A special harness was designed to protect the aircraft, with two softly-lined straps being thrown around the fuselage and attached to a trapeze. Three cables of 12 mm thickness were then connected from the hook of the Mi-6 to the trapeze, while two others were attached to the wingtips. The Mi-6 was able to lift a fully-fuelled and armed MiG-17, but in the case of MiG-19s and MiG-21s, only empty aircraft could be carried.
Potrei anche pescare qualche nota da un libro sull'f4G nella desert storm e desert shield. Ma devo ancora collezionarle...